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Addendum: the ‘ethnic question’ was not introduced into the Census until 1991




Gijsbert Oonk has proposed  ‘... the concept of ‘settled strangers’ that may help us to understand the ambivalent relations between ‘strangers’ and the local society through generations’, a proposal I will in this article be considering in relation to South Asians who have settled in Britain. The popularity of Britain as a destination and domicile for South Asians,​[1]​ who currently comprise by far the largest group of  both non-EEA immigrants and too new citizens,​[2]​ suggests that South Asians do not feel estranged and thus his suggestion, in turn, raises the question of why some settlers may appear ‘strange’ to members of the ‘local community’? Answering this question requires us to consider how settled strangers stand in relation to the wider community and in Britain, I will argue, South Asian settlers, rather than simply assimilating or integrating have established distinctive ex-pat communities just as settlers tend toward the world over and throughout history (for example, the Asian settlers in East Africa).  Rather than ‘ethnic citizens’, or British natives, or members of ‘diasporas’, British South Asians are ex-pat citizens. How and when the pioneer settlers arrived, how their ex-pat communities developed and how they are viewed by other Britishers has been coloured by the changing nature of  British citizenship along with concomitantly changing migration policies and legislation. Citizenship is never conclusively defined, like migration policy it continues to change through time, and in the conclusion to his study of post-War citizenship and immigration in Britain, Randell Hansen drew attention to the chancy dynamics of this historical process,​[3]​ to the apparently contingent development of British legislation, policy and thinking: we might perhaps be bolder in our analysis and recognise Hansen’s ‘contingency’ as actually being chance which is in the historical driving seat.
Citizenship and migration policy are inseparable; citizenship is the chief gatekeeper at the borders of  modern nation states and changes to citizenship inevitably impact upon migration. In the post-War period British citizenship has continued to change and develop via political reactions to chance events, by events issuing from the coincidence of contingent states;​[4]​ concomitantly, these changes have impacted upon migration legislation and too they have overseen patterns of migration. The music for this dance of citizenship and migration has been played by the ending of Empire and by the substantial and continuing increase in South Asian immigration since the War. I begin this paper by discussing the ending of Imperial subjecthood and its impact upon migration, I then trace the development of citizenship legislation alongside the growth of South Asian migration, the emergence of ethnic citizenship, and migration policy, concluding by arguing that rather than considering South Asians immigrants and their descendents as ‘settled strangers’ who need to be integrated we should instead view them as members of settled ex-pat communities, settled in Britain by chance, whom over time will become less and less strange in the eyes of the ‘local community’.
----------------------------------------------------------
Far, far more ‘South Asians’ have settled or have been born in Britain than Britishers had ever settled in India, but these South Asian immigrants, refugees, or more likely nowadays British-born citizens have a short history of migration and settlements dating back only, for the great majority, some 50 years. Though Indians, those living on the Indian Subcontinent before the creations of Pakistan and then Bangladesh, had enjoyed the right to settle in Britain from the time when the sub-continent was subsumed within the British Empire very few exercised this right.​[5]​ This right of settlement free of immigration restrictions for Imperial subjects held good until 1962, having been reaffirmed after the War in the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA).
The BNA was introduced to and supported in Parliament as an Act faithful to the long-standing Imperial ethos which, much like the European Union today, championed the free movements of capital, goods and subjects throughout the Empire. British governments tried to hold the line that anybody who had been born in the Empire acquired by jus soli Imperial subjecthood.  Though jus soli, the awarding of citizenship by dint of birth in a country or sovereign territory had been a coherent basis for citizenship for those living within the British sovereign’s domains a problem arose for the children of British subjects who had been born in countries outside of the Empire/Commonwealth and thus could not inherit their parents’ nationality. To overcome this problem of the transmission of subjecthood, the government passed, in 1922 and during the War in 1943, two British Nationality and Status of Aliens Acts which added a new criterion whereby the children of British subjects could inherit their parents’ nationality regardless of where they themselves had been born. As Reiko Karanati  has noted,​[6]​ the older principle of jus soli was joined to jus sanguinis, the principle that nationality (subjecthood) was passed on from parents to children, the addition of the bloodline to the accident of birth. It would be jus sanguinis that, by 1971, would come to wholly supersede  jus soli as the criterion for, and the means of inheritance, for British subjects.
Imperial equity of status and migratory rights was challenged and eroded by the white Dominion countries, the driving force behind changes to the Empire before 1945. 
Up until the Second World War effective challenges to the British Empire came less from nationalists in India, more from the white Dominion countries. The pre-eminence of  Dominion countries in the Empire and then Commonwealth, the tellingly named ‘countries of settlement’,  reflected past patterns of British emigration. British emigrants had by the late Victorian and Edwardian periods favoured the Dominion countries, so for illustration Canada had become by 1910 one of the top destinations for English, Welsh and Scottish emigrants; this was a key reason why Canada counted for more in the Empire polity than India where very few Britishers had actually permanently settled, along with the comparative economic prowess of the Dominions,​[7]​ and too after the First World War the debt of gratitude which the British felt they owed for the Dominions’ support.​[8]​ The title  ‘Dominion’ had been adopted by six Imperial members​[9]​ but the status of these countries, in particular their relationship to Britain, remained vague and after the First World War the Dominions sought clarity with General Smuts calling, at the 1921 Imperial Conference for a constitution to be drawn-up for the Empire. Though Smut’s proposal was not accepted, the idea of placing the Empire on a formal footing persisted and in 1926 one of the South African Conference delegates, J.M.B. Hertzog, insisted that the relationship between the by now largely self-governing Dominions and Britain be  precisely defined. In response the Chair of the committee tasked with examining inter-Imperial relationships, the former British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, having persuaded the committee that they were not in the business of drafting a constitution, wrote a report which became known as the ‘Balfour Formula’, a formula which explicitly distinguished the Dominions from the colonial members of the Empire and acknowledged the equal status of Britain and all of the Dominions:
‘They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of  Nations.’​[10]​

Though the Dominions were now political equals with Britain they were included in the newly-created British Commonwealth of Nations as ‘communities’, rather than truly independent states, still bound by their allegiance to the British Crown unlike in the colonies whose populations were still subjects of the monarch. Balfour’s Formula was enacted in 1931, under the Statute of Westminster but this ingenious compromise, as Randall Hansen has argued,​[11]​ became challenged by a post-War citizenship initiative from the Canadian Government.
In the aftermath of the Second World War no British political party was exercised by migration or citizenship per se; Attlee’s first government had far more pressing concerns. No political party had any policy over migration and no 1945 election manifesto mentioned the topic (the first General Election manifesto mention would be made by Labour, in 1964).  Policy for the millions of displaced peoples and refugees washed-up in Britain as the waves of war receded was ad hoc and made pragmatically.
What did concern Attlee personally, and too many of his Cabinet who shared Attlee’s opposition to Imperialism (e.g. Alexander, Cripps, Bevan, Crossman)​[12]​ was Britain’s political standing in the post-War world, i.e. her standing as the head of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth politics came quickly to a head when the Canadian Prime Minster unexpectedly announced, without prior consultation with Britain, in violation of the ‘common code’, that his government would be enacting new legislation that would award subjecthood as a subsidiary of Canadian citizenship, a break with the established ordering of subjecthood and citizenship and a challenge to the principle that all subjects of the British Crown held an unmediated, equal relationship to the monarch. 
Britain, unlike white Dominion members of Commonwealth, had been keen to maintain free movement for her Imperial subjects throughout Empire: before the War there had been no restrictions to them entering Britain, in accord with the long-standing Imperial ethos of  migratory equity for all Imperial subjects. In 1918, bowing to fait accompli  from the Dominions who needed immigrants to boost their inadequate populations but were keen to exclude South Asians,​[13]​ Britain had accepted Dominion countries’ control over local migration, but with the important proviso that British Subjects would then be treated equally to natives once they had been admitted. A little later, at the 1930 Conference, it was agreed the Dominions could award local citizenship, more rightly local naturalisation, but that what was known as the ‘common code’, would continue to determine who was and was not a British subject.​[14]​ Thus, before the Second World War any colonial subject could freely enter Britain and any colonial country and, if allowed to enter a Dominion country they would thereafter be treated as equals to that Dominion’s natives. After the War Canada wanted complete control of her own national borders, and too greater national autonomy, hence her citizenship Act which reversed imperial and national standings; now after 1946 Canadians became members of the Commonwealth by virtue of being Canadian citizens. 
In response to Canada’s unexpected initiative, Attlee’s government passed the British Nationality Act (BNA), an Act which enjoyed a wide measure of cross-party support. The Act set out six forms of citizenship, the chief two of which were Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) and Citizen of Independent Commonwealth Countries (CICC); all holders of these two citizenships, numbering hundreds of millions, were entitled freely to enter, live and work in the United Kingdom on exactly the same footing as British natives. In the same week that the Act was passed the emblematic Empire Windrush docked at Tilbury carrying some 500 Jamaican immigrants,​[15]​ signalling for later historians the start of mass Commonwealth migration. 
First in a journal article, then too in his book,​[16]​ Hansen has pointed out that the 1948 BNA concerned the politics of post-War citizenship, and was not about migration but that nevertheless it would be the 1948 BNA which unintentionally and unexpectedly, i.e. by chance, formed the political framework that shaped post-War British immigration and led to the unforeseen development of contemporary multicultural Britain. Perhaps we might widen Hansen’s useful observation by noting that the politics of  post-War citizenship was a further expression of the earlier political dynamics of Empire, of the reactive efforts made by Britain to maintain her leadership of the Empire, and Britain’s wish to preserve a coherent Empire, in the face of  the growing demands for independence from the Dominions. 
Similarly, in the Indian Subcontinent the demand for independence demanded the attention of Attlee’s first government and a rejigging of Commonwealth membership criteria. Just as Attlee was committed to Indian independence, so too Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative Prime Minister at the time of the 1926 Conference which approved the Balfour Formula, had been won over to the nationalists’ case.​[17]​ At the 1926 Conference India had been represented by the Maharajah of Burdwan,​[18]​ in recognition of the intention, announced in the 1919 Governance of India Act, for India to become a Dominion member of the Commonwealth. Moves toward dominionship were slow, too slow for many an Indian nationalist: in 1935 under the next Governance of India Act membership of the Provincial Governments was made wholly by elections, the franchise was increased six-fold to 30,000,000 and only three areas, foreign affairs, defence and land revenue, were  reserved for British appointees. This Act was also meant to have started the process of changing India in to a federation made up of both the Provinces and the Native States but owing to a number of factors including disagreements amongst the Princes,​[19]​ the British underestimation of Congress’s political strength and the widening of Muslim/Hindu divisions this plan stalled and was still not realised by 1939 when war broke out. After the War, after independence had been achieved, at Nehru’s request, Mountbatten stayed on as Governor and India remained within the Commonwealth but the next year, at the 1948 Commonwealth Conference Nehru mooted his government’s intention of declaring India a republic which provoked a constitutional crisis for a Commonwealth without a constitution. The point at issue was, of course, whether a sovereign independent republic could remain in a commonwealth whose members were bound by common allegiance or subjecthood to the British Crown. Once again, as with the accommodation of the Dominions’ demands for greater autonomy, the British promoted a compromise designed to retain India in the Commonwealth, a compromise lauded, in the 1949 Final Communique from the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, as an example of  ‘… the traditional capacity of the Commonwealth to strengthen its unity of purpose while adapting its organisation and procedures to changing circumstances.’​[20]​ Known as the ‘London Declaration’, this compromise over membership acknowledged the Government of India’s ‘… acceptance of The King as the symbol of free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth’​[21]​ and laid the foundations for the ‘New Commonwealth’. Once again, the unity of the Commonwealth and Britain’s position at its head had been preserved and provision was made for the expected moves toward independence by further Commonwealth members such as Pakistan which became an independent republic member in 1955, six years after India.
The scene was now set for the first dance of citizenship and migration which would last until 1971. The music for this dance was composed by chance. British subjecthood had been replaced by Commonwealth citizenship, by Citizenship of the United Kingdom and the Colonies established under the 1948 Act but Britain, unlike India, Pakistan and the white Dominion countries did not have her own national citizenship. 
The arrival of the Windrush, that bellwether of migration, had been unexpected and similarly the growing Commonwealth migration trend that gathered pace in the 1950s had not been foreseen nor planned for nobody had expected 100s of 1,000s of Commonwealth immigrants to take up their right to enter and live in Britain (some 500,000 arrived before June 1961). There were no governmental schemes to help the new arrivals. In fact ‘Commonwealth’ immigrants, what were then called ‘coloured’ immigrants, came from a small number of very specific areas of the old Empire: in the 1950s Afro-Caribbeans largely from the islands of Jamaica and Barbados, South Asians largely from Gujarat, the Punjab, Sylhet and Kashmir. Until 1960 the numbers of Afro-Caribbean immigrants greatly exceeded those from South Asia, over three times as many​[22]​ despite the far larger populations of Pakistan and India compared to those of the Caribbean islands.  The volume of South Asian migration remained low until 1960 after which their numbers began to rise sharply with over 92,000 arriving between 1961 to June 1962. 
The sharp rise in South Asian migration from 1960 until the first half of 1962 had been facilitated by the easing of  emigration controls as the governments of India and Pakistan were forced to relax their earlier stiff emigration restrictions​[23]​ and it had accelerated as migrants moved quickly so as to avoid anticipated tighter migration controls by Britain. The fear of impending restrictions proved well-founded as the first Commonwealth Immigrants Act entered the statue books in 1962, passed in political response to the perception of  worsening race relations, or more specifically because of  pressure on Conservative governments from the Tory party in the country and from sections of the media.​[24]​ ‘Race relations’, as they were then known, became politicised in Britain in the wake of the 1958 Nottingham and Notting Hill riots when black Londoners learned that they were not welcome in the Mother Country, that London was not ‘the place for me’.​[25]​ The media’s and too some key politicians’ response was to blame the immigrants for the actions of the white rioters and to link social problems to numbers of immigrants whilst dismissing convicted white rioters as a few, unrepresentative, ‘bad apples’. Though denied at the time, and for decades after, these ‘riots’ were in fact attacks made on black Commonwealth immigrants by white Britishers orchestrated by fascistic organisations​[26]​ and although the convicted white rioters were roundly condemned in the courts and in the press, and given stiff sentences, the blame for the disturbances was lodged at the door of the immigrants themselves who were blamed for provoking the ‘riots’ by their unacceptable, un-British behaviour. For the first time the issue of  Commonwealth immigrants not conforming to native British standards of behaviour was voiced in respectable public discourse. These charges of culpable un-Britishness had been levelled against black Caribbean immigrants but the political response, the 1962 Act, was intended to restrict all Commonwealth migration at a time when all Commonwealth immigrants were commonly treated as a homogenous group of ‘coloureds’. Characteristically, this was a reactive political measure and equally characteristically it sought to reduce the supply of immigrants: in a harbinger of  New Labour’s migration policy, migration was explicitly linked to UK labour-market demands through admittance under a voucher scheme with numerical caps on gross immigration. Though prompted by issues concerning Afro-Caribbeans just by chance it was South Asians who were most affected by the Act. Both groups rushed to beat the expected restrictions, but after the Act was enforced it was South Asian immigration which was most affected. Vouchers favoured more skilled and professional South Asians and the Act permitted spouses and close dependents to join those immigrants already living in Britain. Given that most South Asians had been young single men, economic migrants who had not planned to settle in Britain, they were more likely to be joined by their family members. In the 1960s, most Commonwealth immigrants were now dependents, and in reversal of the 1950s’ pattern, they were now mostly Indian and Pakistani.​[27]​ In fact, Britain’s Afro-Carribean migration population stabilised after 1971 at some half million continuing at roughly this size for the next 40 years, unlike the South Asian populations which grew dramatically, from fewer than 40,00 in 1951 to 106,300 in 1961, by 1971 413,155, reaching 1,431,346 in 1991.​[28]​ After 1971, after the 1971 Immigrants Act had put an end to any New Commonwealth migratory privileges, most of the growth came from family consolidation, from the birth of children and the arrival of fiancés and spouses, and from the arrival of those leaving, or being expelled from, the former British African colonies of  Kenya, Uganda and Malawi. 
The East African Asian Crises and the reactive enactment of the (2nd.) Commonwealth Immigrants Act are now well-covered in the research literature but for the purposes of this discussion it may be worth noting a few features of this unhappy, tragic chapter: this was an unexpected drama in which citizenship legislation played the starring role.​[29]​ The East African Asian Crises called forth a wholly unexpected consequence of the 1948 BNA: when the Act was passed the expectation had been that people would choose to stay in independent former British colonies, and indeed most did but of course nobody had foreseen Asians would be scapegoated for the failures of African independence. The highly visible, comparatively tiny South Asian communities, the majority of whom were Gujarati (70%) along with a smaller number of Punjabis (26%) and Goans (4%)​[30]​ were internally fragmented, comparatively wealthy and mostly held British passports but in the Crises, which divided Labour and Conservatives both against each other and too within each Party, these passports no longer permitted their bearers freely to enter the UK. In February 1968 Harold Wilson’s second government led by the new Home Secretary Jim Callaghan rushed the (2nd) Commonwealth Immigrants Act through parliament to prevent Kenyan Asians from entering, a nationally shaming episode replayed four years later by Heath’s Government who initially washed their hands of responsibility for the Ugandan Asian refugees, only relenting at the last moment to permit some 28,500 to settle in the UK,​[31]​ illustrating that both Parties cared less for their stated principles than they did for public opinion. During these two Crises legal citizenship had come to the fore, overshadowing any moral or lasting Imperial obligations and in the 1968 Act a new legal concept had been introduced, the notion of ‘close connection’, later refined in the 1971 Act as ‘patrial’ connection, meaning that only those who had been born or naturalised in Britain, or were the children or grandchildren of  male patrials, could have free admittance into, and the right of abode in, the UK. Moreover, the 1971 Act dispensed with the earlier criterion of jus soli, ‘patriality’ was an expression of jus sanguinis. This Act, which effectively ended primary New Commonwealth migration and which came to inform the writing of the 1981 British Immigration Act, had, once again, been passed initially in response to unforeseen events. As we now know, thanks to the release of  previously secret cabinet minutes, Edward Heath’s unexpectedly elected government was keen to placate their own supporters and the vocal anti-immigration faction within the Conservative Parliamentary Party by introducing further immigration controls, but at the same time they were equally keen to preserve migration privileges for white Dominion citizens, and were prepared to risk charges of racism in their favouring of Dominion over new Commonwealth immigrants.​[32]​ The 1971 Act, in progression from the 1962 and 1968 Acts, ended all migration privileges for New Commonwealth citizens who were now to be issued with work permits rather than vouchers, permits that did not allow for either permanent residence or the entry of dependents and which marked the ending of the equity of citizenship and consequential migratory rights for Commonwealth citizens that had been upheld in the 1948 British Nationality Act.
The South Asian immigrants and their dependents who had arrived before the 1971 Act were by now building settled communities. In common with immigrants the world over, just as the British had in India so too they built ex-pat communities intended to preserve their customs, culture, religions – their earlier ways of life - in an alien milieu. Their demographics varied, as too did patterns of settlement, employment, education, marriage and their engagement with the wider British society. Partly, this diversity reflected the specific migratory histories of South Asians, especially their encounters with citizenship legislation, partly the cultural baggage they carried with them, partly in response to the specific socioeconomic conditions in Britain when the primary immigrants had first arrived. As I have argued,​[33]​ these were chance differentials, contingent factors affecting the settlement and progress of the South Asians. For example British East African Asians, who now comprise some third of British Indians, were markedly different from the earlier South Asian immigrants. They had first arrived as fairly intact families, as exiles or refugees and not as primary male economic migrants via the classic chain migratory route along which Pakistani immigrants had travelled before 1962 after which they had been joined by their families. East African Asians, often professionals and middle class, came equipped with business experience and acumen, in contrast to Pakistani settlers who were poorly educated with poor labour-market skills. East African Asians are now one of the UK’s most successful and prosperous British minority ethnic communities having, counter-intuitively, ultimately benefitted from expulsion from East Africa. Whereas, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis had arrived as classic single-men chain migrants with very poor educations, often illiterate, and with few labour-market skills, and then went to work in textile mills and foundries in west Yorkshire and the Midlands; and then chance stepped in because it was just those industries which floundered and collapsed in the late ‘60s, early ‘70s, disproportionately affecting Pakistanis in particular, the majority of whom were Muslim, a community whose women mostly didn’t work,​[34]​ meaning that unemployment was keenly felt as the male earnings, the family wage, was lost.
These discrepancies, including the chance discrepancies of arrival periods, differing host conditions and citizenship encounters, etc. unsurprisingly resulted in differing patterns of  progress for the various South Asian communities but such chancy factors, along with the banal expat nature of their development,  became overshadowed by explanations that focused upon cultural, especially religio-cultural peculiarities as the concept of ‘ethnicity’ gained ground. For as British researchers became more knowledgeable, as South Asian communities just as in East Africa became more distinct over time, the earlier gross division between ‘blacks and whites’ which corralled all New Commonwealth citizens into the same categorical camp along with Afro-Caribbeans increasingly grew less defensible descriptively, for research purposes and also politically.​[35]​ Large official British surveys began, in the 1970s, to employ ethnic categories, the ‘ethnic question’ had been intended to be included in the 1981 was first introduced in the 1991 Census. In the 1980s Tariq Modood​[36]​ was arguing vigorously that British blacks and South Asians shared little in common, not intermixing, not living together, not inter-marrying and pursuing discrete political agendas. One key component of South Asian ethnic identity, it was argued, was the cleaving to a religiously-informed life, a religious commitment that strengthened over time, confounding the orthodox view which expected religious affiliation to weaken in successive generations.
Though well-intentioned, the viral spread of ethnicity along with ethnic identities would have unfortunate consequences. Distinguishing by ethnicity facilitated comparisons both between South Asians to the national majority and too intra-community comparisons. Furthermore, ethnic identity became a group identity, of belonging to some ethnic collective or other: Britain changed from a country of  individual citizens with equal legal and political rights and obligations to a nation comprising majority and minority gangs of ethnically-distinguished citizens.
Though today in Britain ethnicity is ubiquitous with citizens willingly identifying themselves in ethnic terms (for example, undergraduate students obligingly completing their registration forms by ticking their ethnic box), the precise definition of this classificatory parvenu is contentious as too are the proper measures to be used in distinguishing ethnic identity:​[37]​ in accordance with the concept’s subjectivity, which appears to promise the agency denied by discredited biological categories of race, ethnicity has come to be understood in terms of  the values which people hold. This emphasis upon values came, in turn, to inform issues of citizenship.
The year which saw the ethnic question mooted for inclusion in the national Census also witnessed the formulation, for the first time, of a specifically British citizenship. British citizenship had not been distinguished in the 1948 BNA, nor in subsequent immigration Acts, the BNA’s Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies was retained for a decade after the rights of Commonwealth citizenry equity had been terminated in the 1971 Act. CUKC citizenship as amended in the 1971 Act was, however, seen as unsatisfactory, as incoherent, with citizenship not properly aligned with immigration and so in1977 Jim Callaghan’s Labour Government published a Green Paper, British Nationality Law: Discussion of Possible Changes as the first consultative step toward clarifying citizenship. From now on, it would be immigration issues which would determine citizenship, a reversal of the preceding determination, because as the Green Paper pointed out:
‘The most serious drawback to the status of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies is that it does not provide a ready definition of who has the right of entry to the United Kingdom.’​[38]​

Before their Green Paper could be drafted as a White Paper to be introduced into Parliament, Labour lost office and it was left to Thatcher’s incoming Conservative government to finish the job. The 1979 Conservative election manifesto had announced the Party’s intention of introducing a new British nationality bill which was passed into law as the 1981 British Nationality Act, an act which the Prime Minster, Margret Thatcher,  considered to be ‘part of our proposals to limit future large-scale immigration to Britain – not least immigration from the Indian sub-continent.’​[39]​ For the first time, a specifically British citizenship based upon jus sanguinis had been created and the bill’s passage through Parliament was contentious, seen by some as imperilling the citizenship status of Britishers living in dependencies such as Gibraltar and Hong Kong and too because the bill, by ending the automatic right of Commonwealth citizens to register as British citizens alarmed Britain’s settled Commonwealth communities leading to a sharp rise in applications for naturalisation.​[40]​ Nor did it escape academics’ attention that the formulation of citizenship was being driven by immigration issues; as White and Hampson observed in their critical examination of the legislation:
‘In short, the proposals seem effectively to concern immigration law, not nationality law. [..] The new categories [of citizenship] largely relabel existing immigration categories.’​[41]​

There were to be three ‘new categories’ of citizenship but the old concept of  jus sanguinis ‘patriality’ dating from the 1971 Immigration Act was retained as the qualifying criterion only now, in tune with the spirit of the times it was no longer just patrilineal, children would now be able to inherit their citizenship from their mother too.  Though the 1981 Act stipulated the criteria for British citizenship eligibility, and the rights accorded to British citizens, this legal move did not define the meaning of citizenship, its civic character, and in the 1980s citizenship became a contested item on the public political agenda leading to the Conservative Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, introducing the idea of ‘active citizenship’, an idea endorsed by Margret Thatcher at the 1988 Conservative Party annual conference,  a move intended to promote the Conservative project of ending the so-named ‘dependency culture’ in favour of  the self-reliant, entrepreneurial heroes  beloved of the ‘New Right’.​[42]​ This was a new, political, conception of citizenship, not one deriving from national culture or history, and one which, though pursued by Thatcher’s governments and then by her successor John Major, would be most fully articulated by the Labour Governments from 1997 to 2010.
The measures taken by the Labour governments to articulate the meaning of British citizenship were made against a backdrop of  ethnic and migration issues that in both qualitative and quantitative terms were very different from the situation in 1981, let alone 1971 or 1948. While the British black community, now made up largely of  settled citizens had remained roughly the same size for the past 40 years, the South Asian communities had been growing apace, as illustrated in this table composed by Roger Ballard:​[43]​
Ethno-national origins              1961            1971                 1981           1991                 2001
India                                           81,400       240,730             673,704      823,821          1,028,539
Pakistan                                    24,900        127,565             295,461     449,646             706,752
Bangladesh                                -------             ------                 64,562     157,881            275,250
East Africa                                  --- ---            44,860            181,321      ----------              --------
Total South Asian population 106,300       413,155        1,215,048   1,431,348           2,010,541
% of South Asians in UK population 0.23%       0.85%             2.52%         3.04%               4.00%
Ballard’s figures illustrate not merely the strong numerical and proportional growth of the British South Asian community, at a time when the national population was stable, but also the marked demographic differentials between the ethno-national communities with British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, nearly all of whom are Muslims growing far faster, especially in the period 1981 to 200, than British Indians, whom in religious terms are mainly Hindus and Sikh.  It was to be these youthful communities of British South Asian Muslim citizens who would be faced by events such as the Ray Honeyford debacle, the Salman Rushdie affair, the wars involving Muslims in Yugoslavia and the Middle East, and the contest for political leadership of the Ummah, the international community of Muslims which, research dating from the 1980s had shown, was superseding a British Islamic identity for the younger generation of British Muslims.​[44]​ That the British Muslim communities, the majority of whom have a Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage, experienced a pronounced demographic growth, yielding a skewed youthful profile, in the same period in which domestic and international events were commanding attention was coincidental, down to chance. 
Migration, citizenship and too asylum applications were all on the busy New Labour agenda.​[45]​ When Blair’s first administration took office it was to be asylum seekers who received most attention from the new Labour administration, as too they were receiving from newspapers. In 1997 asylum seekers numbered some 28,100, numbers  jumped to 78,700 three years later and peaked in 2003 at 84,132.​[46]​ Like immigration flows, these rising asylum numbers were unexpected and unpredictable, a tragic train of victims from wars and conflicts many of which Britain had been involved with​[47]​ and too an aberrant spike as the numbers fell just as dramatically as they had risen; by 2010 when Labour lost office they had fallen below their 1997 volume. However, between 1994 and 2003, the upsurge in asylum applications were adding substantially to net migration figures and to generally hostile public debate; in their first term of office Labour introduced the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999), the first of several measures intended to restrict the right of appeal and the provision of support for asylum applicants. During their first term Labour also enacted the British Overseas Territories Act (2002) which in the opinion of the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook would ‘at last lay the Empire to rest’ by granting full citizenship to those remaining in dependent, overseas territories. Alongside these Acts, Labour had begun to address  immigration: immigrants were now arriving increasingly from Europe and elsewhere outside the Commonwealth, and arriving in sharply rising numbers, from 327,000 in 1997 when Labour first took office to 481,000 in 2001, the year Labour was next re-elected. In a White Paper in 2002, tellingly entitled Secure Borders, Safe Havens: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain, Labour announced a comprehensive reform of policy and legislation including their aim of ‘managed migration’. This aim was first implemented in the short-lived Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (2002) which for the first time introduced a points-based system for judging the eligibility of migrants, a system later refined and extended to include all immigrants from 2006 onward. Running concurrent with the migration initiatives was an emphasis on the need to ‘integrate’ British minority citizens, an emphasis which may be viewed as an extension of the programme for ‘active citizenship’ that had been devised to fill the lacuna over the meaning of citizenship introduced in the 2001 British Nationality Act.
This emphasis upon integration was married to the multicultural approach Labour favoured, a need to integrate minority ethnic citizens some of whom, as the Cantle Report on the riots in northern cities involving young South Asian Muslims had warned, were held to be leading ‘parallel lives’.​[48]​  For new citizens, integration was to be effected by new language competency rules, the passing of a Knowledge of Life in the UK test and celebrated with public citizenship ceremonies. But, the mass murder of  Londoners in July 2005, the realisation that these terrorist attacks had been committed by ‘home-grown’ terrorists, led to an interrogation of  multiculturalism with Tony Blair, in his speech given in 2006, emphasising the importance of  national British values rather than the equal validity of  ethnic cultures as the glue need to integrate the nation’s citizenry:
“I always thought after 7/7 our first reaction would be very British: we stick together; but that our second reaction, in time, would also be very British: we're not going to be taken for a ride.
People want to make sense of two emotions: our recognition of what we legitimately hold in common and what we legitimately hold distinct. When I decided to make this speech about multiculturalism and integration, some people entirely reasonably said that integration or lack of it was not the problem. The 7/7 bombers were integrated at one level in terms of lifestyle and work. Others in many communities live lives very much separate and set in their own community and own culture, but are no threat to anyone.
But this is, in truth, not what I mean when I talk of integration. Integration, in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. It is about values. It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values. It isn't about what defines us as people, but as citizens, the rights and duties that go with being a member of our society.”​[49]​

Blair left office in 2007 and it would be Blair’s successor as Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, who would carry forward the project to strengthen integration through the emphasis upon ‘common unifying British values’, and too Brown’s administration that would implement the Points Based System for ‘managed migration’.  
Soon after Blair stepped down in 2007 and Gordon Brown was handed the New Labour baton, Brown and Jack Straw announced ‘We want to forge a new relationship between government and citizen ….’​[50]​  Lord Goldsmith, the former Attorney General was asked to review legal aspects of citizenship: this naturally involved examining the nature of British citizenship, for as Goldsmith had said at the launch of his review:
"Calling a person a citizen is an important step. We accept people into our national community when we make them citizens. And, by seeking citizenship, a person expresses their desire to be a member of our community. Yet we take citizenship for granted in this country, especially when people are born with it.
"This review is an opportunity to address that. Over the next few months, I am hoping to articulate more clearly the significance of citizenship, and develop recommendations to ensure that our approach to citizenship is appropriate for modern issues of migration, identity and civic participation."

When it was published Goldsmith’s lengthy, and detailed Report didn’t actually contain much in the way of  innovative policy recommendations, more a list of enhancements to existing practices such as citizenship lessons and ceremonies, but it did become a reference point for politicians and it reinforced the view, held as we’ve seen by Blair and too by many another politician across the party divide, that citizenship boils down to a set of common values and that the way to combat home-grown terrorism and achieve community cohesion was by promoting those distinctively British values.  As Blair had prefigured in his 2006 speech, the emphasis began to move  away from multiculturalism and back toward integration. 
In his Report, Goldsmith tells us that: ‘I have not considered it part of my remit to make recommendations about levels of immigration to the UK.’ – but this issue had been on New Labour’s radar for a decade and too it was high on the electors’ list of policy priorities; from 2007 onward opinion poll data was showing it as their top or second issue as gross immigration reached record levels. In 2006 the Government’s detailed proposals for the Points Based System had been published as, A points-based system: Making Migration Work for Britain. The then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, set out the rationale for the system:
‘The system we have at present is complex and difficult to understand. We will
bring all our current work schemes and students into a simple points-based
system designed to ensure that we are only taking migrants for jobs that cannot
be filled from our own workforce and focusing on the skilled workers we need
most like doctors, engineers, finance experts, nurses and teachers.’

The Points Based System was launched on the 28th of  February 2008, with the implementation of Tier 1. Tiers 2 and 5 were implemented on 27th of November 2008; Tier 4 on the 31st of  March 2009 (Tier 3, for low-skilled workers has never been implemented). There were no numerical caps placed upon the visas issued for the four tiers in operation, numbers were driven by the markets.​[51]​
The final Act of Brown’s government in this area, literally the final Act, the last piece of legislation they enacted, was The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill (2009). This bill had a rough passage through both Houses of  Parliament, immigration and border security were hot topics in 2009, the long period of economic growth which Labour had taken credit for had now ended as had too credit in the financial system, Brown’s government was politically vulnerable. In truth however, this Bill was only a stop-gap, a holding measure, Labour had promised that they would introduce a new, definitive Bill intended to simplify all legislation over migration which would provide a definitive legal framework. About half of the interim 2009 Bill was taken up with enhancing Border security and increasing the powers of  Border officers; the only major, significant element in the Bill related to citizenship (in the readings of the Bill in both Houses the speakers in the debates referred often to Goldsmith’s report on citizenship). 
Until the enactment of this Bill, citizenship had been awarded with respect to time spent living in the U.K., now it was to be earned. Immigrants wishing to become British citizens had now to earn that privilege. Now applicants were required to follow the ‘path to citizenship’, which meant five years living in Britain legally, followed by at least a year’s ‘probationary citizenship’ leading to full citizenship after earning a certain number of points, through volunteer work or ‘civic activism’. Only certain categories of immigrants would be allowed to take the path to citizenship: those holding visas for Tiers 1 & 2, those immigrants with family members who were already UK citizens, refugees and those with humanitarian claims. This innovation, the change from residence requirement to earned citizenship, was due to come into effect in July 2011 – however, this timetable ran over the timetable for General Elections​[52]​ and under the British system incoming administrations, in this case the Conservative Coalition, are not obliged to maintain the legislative programme of their predecessor: in a surprise announcement on the 5th  of November 2010 the Home Secretary Theresa May told us that the Coalition was dropping earned citizenship: 
'We will not implement Labour's policy of earned citizenship, which was too complicated, bureaucratic and, in the end, ineffective. [..] We will make further announcements in due course. In the interim, the current rules and requirements for obtaining settlement and citizenship will remain in place.”

This is how things stand at present, the Coalition haven’t yet announced what they intend to do and so it’s back to 5 years’ legal residency, the Life in the UK multiple-answer test and a citizenship ceremony, or if your English is below ESOL Level 3 a combined language and citizenship test.​[53]​ 
Immigration rode high in the 2010 General Election with British voters placing it at the top of their agenda of concerns. The current Coalition government is committed to reducing net migration down to the ‘10s of 1,000s’ by further restricting each Tier of the Points Based System they had inherited from Labour. To date, there has been no appreciable reduction in net migration (an unwise policy target):​[54]​ in 2010 when Labour lost office net migration stood at some 255,000, it now stands at 250,000.​[55]​ New Commonwealth immigration has reached a new record high, most of whom hail from the Indian Subcontinent:
‘There has been an increase in the estimated number of New Commonwealth citizens immigrating to the UK. In the year to June 2011, an estimated 170,000 people from New Commonwealth countries immigrated to the UK. This is the highest recorded estimate. Provisional data are not available by individual country, but final figures released in November 2011 show that 75 per cent of arrivals from New Commonwealth countries in 2010 were from the Indian Subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka).’​[56]​

In addition to keeping faith with Labour’s system for managing migration, the Coalition government has also followed Blair’s and Brown’s reemphasis upon integration of the citizenry through common British values. In his Speech on Managed Migration and Earned Citizenship Gordon Brown, in 2008, had opined that:
‘Citizenship is not an abstract concept, or just access to a passport. 
I believe it is - and must be seen as - founded on shared values that define the character of our country.’​[57]​

The Coalition government, led by David Cameron, are currently following their Labour predecessors, treating migration and citizenship as conjoined issues which are to be tackled by integrating minority ethnic citizens and immigrants by means of shared national values. And, as had Labour, it is these shared values that are being trumpeted rather than multiculturalism. In a widely-reported speech given at a conference on security in Munich in February 2011, Cameron denounced what he called ‘state multiculturalism’ claiming it lay at the root of ‘extremist ideologies’ and that it could lead younger British Muslims down Islamicist avenues: the solution according to Cameron, was to end ‘state multiculturalism’, and then to:
‘ ... build stronger societies and stronger identities at home.  Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism.  A passively tolerant society says to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just leave you alone.  It stands neutral between different values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values and actively promotes them.’​[58]​

A year after delivering his Munich speech, in February 2012,  the Prime Minister’s Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Eric Pickles, published his strategies and plans for implementing the Coalition government’s policies for integrating British citizens and immigrants. Once again it was national British values which took centre stage:
‘Our history and our shared values mean we are better placed than many other countries to meet the challenges of integration.
We believe that core values and experience must be held in common. We should be robustly promoting British values such as democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity and treatment, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind. It is these values which make it possible for people to live and work together, to bridge boundaries between communities and to play a full role in society.’​[59]​

Pickle’s practical measures for promoting these ‘core values’ (e.g. a ‘community music day’, a ‘big lunch’) turned out to be as anodyne as the specific values which successive politicians have held up as nationally characteristic of Britain. 
In fact, when it comes to the measuring of citizenship in terms of identifying with where you live then there is scant evidence that the British people are much exercised by issues of ‘belonging’ to their local neighbourhoods or to the country: British Asians in particular do not report feeling estranged. The government’s Citizenship Survey for 2009-10, the latest data from these large-scale surveys which have been conducted since 2001, found that:
‘As in previous years, there was a strong sense of ‘belonging’ to the
immediate neighbourhood, local area and Britain, with the sense of
belonging to Britain remaining strongest.’
and moreover:
‘There were differences in sense of belonging by ethnicity. Asian groups
were more likely than other ethnic groups to feel a strong sense of
belonging to their neighbourhood. Bangladeshi (88%), Pakistani (83%)
and Indian (81%) people felt a stronger sense of belonging to their
neighbourhood than White (77%), Black Caribbean (76%), Black African
(74%), Other ethnicity (72%), Chinese (70%) and Mixed Race (69%)
people. There was little variation in terms of strength of belonging to Britain
among these groups.’​[60]​
However, this same generally optimistic Report noted the continuing strong opposition to immigration:
‘The Citizenship Survey asked people whether they thought the number of immigrants coming into Britain nowadays should be increased, remain the same or be reduced. Very few overall (3%) believed that immigration should be increased. People were far more likely to say that immigration should be reduced. Over the past three survey years, attitudes have been fairly consistent. Almost eight in ten people (77%-79%) said that the number of immigrants should be reduced and around two in ten people (19%) that it should remain the same. Very few people, no more than one in twenty (3% to 5%) over the period wanted immigration levels to increase.’​[61]​

Opposition to immigration was voiced rather more strongly by white citizens and this general opposition to immigration has long been noted in research studies with British opposition higher than in other comparable countries.​[62]​  One problem faced by British South Asians, the great majority of whom were born in Britain, is that they may be (mis)identified as unpopular immigrants, rather than as true native Britishers which nowadays is phrased in the language of citizenship. 
British legal citizenship has developed, as I have suggested, at the prompting of chance events and chance factors, from jus solis subjecthood, to jus soli plus jus sanguinis  Imperial subjecthood, then Commonwealth citizenship, and now is defined wholly under the 1981 British Nationality Act in jus sanguinis legal terms. 
As I have noted, though the underpinning of ‘patriality’ retained from the 1971 Act in the 1981 BNA appears much the same as the older notion of  jus soli it is in fact a new criterion: whereas jus soli is based upon your place of birth, the 1981 BNA, borrowing from the 1971 Act, introduced the criterion of  jus sanguinis wherein  a child's citizenship is determined by its parents' citizenship, with citizenship being inherited by blood (the Latin etymology) rather than by soil. This unnoticed but profound change accords uncomfortably with racialist notions of citizenship and identity. As we have seen, this move toward legal definition and state award brought in its train the problem of  content – what did this legal category actually mean? – a problem that has come to be addressed in terms of  national values. The current Coalition government is pursuing its reform of the migration apparatus in terms of  trying to restrict numbers in order to meet its net target, while at the same time insisting that immigrants, along with new citizens and settled ‘ethnic’ citizens are integrated – as this very recent statement from the Coalition Home Secretary, here in Parliament defending the Government’s reform of  family migration policy, illustrates:
‘The UK (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​The_UK​) needs a system for family migration that is underpinned by three simple principles: first, that those who come here should do so on the basis of a genuine relationship; secondly, that migrants should be able to pay their way; and thirdly, that they are able to integrate into British society. If people do not meet those requirements, they should not be allowed to come here.’​[63]​

‘Integration’, an aim first championed by the young Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1967 as preferable to homogenising assimilation, is as we have seen to be measured by ‘values’ and may not be an appropriate national policy for  immigrants who, once they achieve sufficient numbers to build communities, tend to favour distinctive ex-pat ways of life. This natural ex-pat tendency has, in Britain, been strengthened by the divisive growth of  ethnic classifications and ethnic identity. It is likely that British South Asian settlers will become another set of ex-pat additions to British society in the manner of earlier Jewish settlers but, in some contradistinction to Oonk’s advocacy of the concept of ‘settled strangers’, members of established ex-pat communities in Britain  can become our friends, our ex-pat friends - just as some Britishers living ex-pat lives in India became friends, sometimes deep friends, with native Indians.
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